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The concept of vulnerability has been employed to develop transport systems that sustain devastating disasters and ensure the
efficient evacuation of neighborhoods. Existing studies of road network vulnerability overlook two important aspects of analysis:
the no-notice evacuation and the different objectives of evacuees and first responders. First, a no-notice evacuation leaves limited
time for proactive emergency planning; therefore, rescue strategies in this scenario rely heavily on real-time traffic information.
Second, the goal of first responders in an evacuation is to move into an affected area immediately after a hazardous event unfolds,
and the risk they face differs from that of evacuees. To this end, this paper develops a network-based model to evaluate vulnerability
during a no-notice evacuation and applies it to a case study in Dublin, OH, USA. The model is suited to assessing network
vulnerability in response to events with uncertainty and coordinating traffic control strategies in a no-notice evacuation. This
study can become a valuable complement to the methodological conceptualization of vulnerability and can provide insights into
developing comprehensive emergency management plans.

1. Introduction
Vulnerability manifests itself in hazardous situations [1].
It is defined as the degree to which a system is exposed
to potential hazards and attacks [2, 3]. The vulnerability
of critical infrastructure during mass evacuations, in such
areas as transport corridors and transit terminals, could
have a significant impact on evacuation efficiency and the
severity of damage incurred. Identifying the vulnerability
of critical infrastructure is key to predicting the likelihood
of neighborhoods experiencing devastating events, such as
terrorist attacks and chemical spills. In order to alleviate the
consequence of such incidents, one component of effective
evacuation planning is to assess the level of vulnerability as a
way to increase preparedness and reduce the loss of life and
property arising from the incidents.
Vulnerability analysis relies on mathematical modeling of
road networks, in which transport systems are abstracted into

networks or graphs, with lines representing road segments
and nodes as intersections and critical facilities [4]. Analyzing the spatial attributes and topological configuration of
networks is essential for gaining an improved understanding
of how transport systems are structured to maintain usage
levels during a period of system failure [5]. Network analysis
has become a topical field in emergency management, as
it overcomes the arbitrariness of multicriteria evaluation
employed in area-based analysis [6–8].
Two important facets have been overlooked in the assessment of road network vulnerability. The first pertains to
the type of evacuation, which could result in very different
threat levels [9]. Hazards can be broadly categorized as
short-notice and no-notice depending on the period of time
allowed for evacuation preparation. Short-notice hazards,
such as earthquakes and tornadoes, are usually broadcast
24–72 hours ahead of the events [10]. Adopting proactive
response strategies, such as contraflow traffic control, optimal

2
routing to shelters, and preparedness of emergency supplies,
could help reduce the destruction and loss of life to a great
extent [10]. No-notice hazards, such as terrorist attacks and
chemical spills, take place without a priori expectation [11–
13]. In response to no-notice hazards, it is nearly impossible
to estimate the development of the scenario, including the
magnitude, duration, and severity of the incidents. When
disaster strikes without warning, effective communication
of real-time traffic information is essential [11]. Studies of
no-notice evacuations are limited in scope as modeling
the uncertainty of built environment poses a considerable
challenge [12, 13].
The second overlooked facet pertains to the fact that the
two groups of people involved in an evacuation, evacuees
and first responders, face very different types of threats
[14]. While evacuees are subject to imminent danger, their
intuitive response to a life-threatening situation is to move
away from at-risk areas [15]. However, it is the mission of
first responders to support and implement rescue orders by
denying their instincts and moving into the affected areas.
The risk to which they are exposed may be even greater
in a no-notice scenario due to scarce resources and limited
information in the response phase [16]. Differentiating the
vulnerabilities faced by evacuees and first responders is of
crucial importance for customizing response strategies that
ensure the safety of both groups.
These two critical issues demand a rethinking of the
notion of vulnerability. In other words, we must measure
vulnerability not only by maintaining accurate geographic
dimensions but also by including empirical observations of
no-notice hazards and an understanding of the different
motivations and needs between evacuees and first responders. To achieve this goal, the paper develops a network-based
vulnerability assessment model by identifying road structure
prone to evacuation difficulty in the event of no-notice
evacuations. This paper not only includes the methodological
formulation of the problem but also estimates traffic patterns
as well as the different needs and response objectives of the
evacuees and first responders. By identifying neighborhoods
that are more likely to suffer evacuation difficulty, emergency
planners can gain an overarching understanding of the areas
in the greatest need of coordination. This knowledge can
facilitate many immediate actions, such as efficient allocation
of relief resources to neighborhoods when incidents occur
without expectation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is a review
of methods for evaluating vulnerability via network analysis.
Section 3 proposes the model that identifies the evacuation
risk moving into and out of a network-based region. The specific details of the travel environment, such as road capacity,
direction of travel, and speed limits are also incorporated into
the model. Section 4 presents a case study that implements
the model in a suburban community of Columbus, OH,
USA. The results derived from the Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) show two different levels of vulnerabilities on
the road level for evacuees and first responders in a no-notice
situation. This finding is supplemented by sensitivity analysis
of the model by examining the model parameters in Section 4,
followed by the conclusions in Section 5.
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2. Analysis of Road Network Vulnerability
To date, there is no consensus on the definition of vulnerability, as it incorporates a variety of foci (e.g., physical,
political, and social), a range of paradigms (e.g., hard, soft,
and critical), and different modes of impact measurement
[17]. Traditional analysis of vulnerability is a decision-making
process dependent on the built environment as well as judgments of participants. Multicriteria evaluations, such as the
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) that integrates potential
socioeconomic loss by geographic unit (e.g., census tract and
state), are adopted. In this process, losses from a disaster
scenario are predicted by analyzing a series of predetermined
physical, environmental, and socioeconomic factors (e.g.,
distance to earthquake faults, housing quality, and potentially
affected population) under a given ranking criterion [6–8, 18,
19]. Although the AHP is relatively practical in arriving at a
collective decision due to its simplicity of implementation,
it has been criticized for the arbitrariness in weighting the
determinants and the change of ranks when new alternatives
are introduced [20]. More importantly, AHP is highly susceptible to the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP), referring
to the fact that spatial patterns are affected by the delineation
of geographic units [21]. In reality, emergency systems are
made up of interconnected parts where a hazardous event
could trigger cascading effects in adjacent units. For example,
a power outage in a target area will impact neighboring
areas [22]. As the AHP overlooks the inherent connectivity
between critical facilities, its application to vulnerability
analysis is questioned.
To overcome these setbacks, recent emergency management studies have begun to create network models with an
emphasis on critical infrastructure. These efforts highlight
network topological characteristics (e.g., accessibility, connectivity, and captivity) and are able to overcome the lack
of connectivity in area-based studies. The goal of network
vulnerability analysis is to identify the worst scenario in
which disabled network elements could disrupt the entire
system [17]. This worst-case analysis relies on normative
models under the constraints of travel environment (e.g.,
road capacity, travel demand). For example, the integral
accessibility measurement can be employed to estimate the
worst-case scenario of how link failures could impact other
parts of the road network [23, 24]; critical infrastructure,
in terms of vital transport nodes/links, can be identified by
modeling the highest potential loss of efficiency in highway
networks [25, 26]; vulnerable roads can be identified by
heuristic models that demarcate at-risk neighborhoods [27–
30]. A subsequent mapping of the vulnerability in the context
of GIS can further help identify the deficiencies in road
networks that may hinder efficient evacuations [27]. These
high-risk neighborhoods can then be enhanced by sufficient
rescue resources and improved connectivity systems in the
phase of preparedness.
Analysis of road networks has demonstrated that the
vulnerability of a region is not only arbitrarily dictated by
existing socioeconomic factors per se but also limited by
the spatial organization of the transport system. This type of
analysis has strengthened the perception that vulnerability
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is beyond the likelihood of loss; it also manifests in the
geographic dimension that plays an integral role in connecting places [31]. Viewing the vulnerability of a region as
the clearance time of evacuation is essentially important for
a short-notice evacuation where the location or trajectory
of a hazard is predictable and a degree of readiness is
available [32]. For example, contraflow traffic control has
significantly improved the efficiency of movement in shortnotice evacuations. However, such operations are heavily
dependent on a priori knowledge of hazards and often require
three to five hours to establish [33, 34]. In the case of a
no-notice evacuation, both the time and resources allowed
for preparation are limited. Thus, the planning process must
emphasize flexibility in operations and may not conform
to well-structured strategies [13, 35]. For example, if a nonotice hazard occurs during rush hours, there may not be
sufficient time to reverse the lanes and regulate the traffic
[13]. Under such abrupt circumstances, travel between two
locations is still rigorously regulated by the traffic code,
such as speed limits and direction of travel. Thus, modeling
road network vulnerability for a no-notice evacuation should
incorporate the regulatory code that exists in the normal
travel environment.
A less elucidated area in no-notice evacuations is the
added risk level for first responders. Unlike evacuees whose
course of action is oriented towards fleeing the danger
zone, the movements of first responders are more complex.
Their actions include improving the situational awareness
of evacuees, providing relief resources, and assisting with
vehicle routing as events unfold [16]. These actions invariably lead to movement into the danger zone and would
expose the first responders to a higher likelihood of injuries
and fatalities [36]. The situation is exacerbated in a nonotice evacuation, as traffic management tactics cannot be
immediately employed at the initial phase of deployment
and thus the commuting traffic may hinder effective rescue
[13, 14]. The nature and scope of the evacuation risk that
first responders cope with must be well understood and
scientifically estimated in order to alleviate the risks arising
from compromised evacuation plans. To date, such critical
factors have not been well investigated in existing research
on road network vulnerability.

3. Modeling Outbound and
Inbound Vulnerabilities
3.1. Illustration of the Problem. This section proposes the
Evacuation Vulnerability Model (EVM) to illustrate and
evaluate the road network vulnerability faced by evacuees
and first responders in no-notice evacuations. The model
is extended from the Critical Cluster Model (CCM) that
estimates evacuation vulnerability at the neighborhood scale
[27–30]. In the model, the difficulty of movement in an
evacuation is considered to be access to and from nodes in
a network-based travel environment. This difficulty of access
is interpreted by the vulnerability ratio depicted in
Vulnerability Ratio =

𝑇
.
𝐶

(1)

In this equation, the vulnerability ratio represents the
difficulty of travel and the potential for traffic congestion for
the node of interest (referred to as the anchor node), where 𝑇
is the total volume of traffic flow and 𝐶 is the capacity of roads
(e.g., number of lanes). When this ratio reaches its maximum,
it creates the most difficult scenario for vehicles at the anchor
node to relocate and can be used to measure the evacuation
vulnerability at this node.
As discussed in the last section, the evacuation risks
faced by evacuees and first responders need to be carefully
differentiated. When hazards strike without notice, evacuees
tend to intuitively move away from the affected area while
first responders are moving into the area to implement
rescue orders. Monitoring these two types of travel can
be accomplished by measuring the evacuation vulnerability
as the outbound risk (for evacuees) and the inbound risk
(for first responders). These two types of vulnerabilities are
discussed in detail below.
Outbound Evacuation Vulnerability. Outbound evacuation
vulnerability (OEV) characterizes the difficulty for evacuees
to travel away from a node. This measurement identifies the
most difficult situation when moving away from the anchor
node. It is measured by maximizing the vulnerability ratio
of all outbound traffic (departure traffic originating from the
region, 𝑇out ) to the total exits of the region (𝐶out ), as depicted
in
𝑇
OEV = max ( out ) .
(2)
𝐶out
An additional constraint on the problem is the direction
of travel. In a no-notice evacuation, driving directions are
rigorously restricted; and, in this case, eligible exits are
defined as the road segments that permit only outbound
travel. This restriction can also be found in variations of the
CCM [29, 30]. Figure 1 illustrates an example of this outbound
evacuation vulnerability for node A, the anchor node in the
sample network. If each node has one unit of outbound traffic
and each arrow represents a single lane, Figure 1(a) shows
the vulnerability ratio of 𝑇out to 𝐶out for node A as one
(i.e., one unit of outbound traffic through exit AB). Then,
the search region (which must include the anchor node A)
keeps expanding until reaching a given limit. For example,
Figure 2(b) shows that this ratio increases to two when the
search region includes both nodes A and B (i.e., two units of
outbound traffic through exit BC). When the region includes
four nodes: A, B, C, and D, the ratio reaches its maximum
of four (i.e., four units of outbound traffic through exit DE).
This maximum value represents the OEV of the anchor node
A, a situation where evacuees from node A may encounter
the highest level of movement difficulty when leaving the
area. Figure 1(d) shows that node A’s outbound vulnerability
ratio varies by the size of the search region and reaches the
maximum at four nodes. After node A’s OEV is identified,
the method can be subsequently applied to other nodes of the
network and thus derives their levels of vulnerability.
Inbound Evacuation Vulnerability. Similarly, inbound evacuation vulnerability (IEV) represents the most difficult scenario
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Figure 1: The procedure of searching for the OEV of anchor node A: (a) the search region includes only node A; (b) the search region
includes nodes A and B; (c) the search region includes four nodes, where the ratio reaches its maximum and node A’s OEV is derived; (d) the
relationship between node A’s outbound vulnerability ratio and the number of nodes in the search region.

for the first responders who must travel into the site. It
is measured by maximizing the vulnerability ratio of all
inbound traffic (arrival traffic destined for the region, 𝑇in ) to
the total entrances of the region (𝐶in ), as depicted in
IEV = max (

𝑇in
).
𝐶in

(3)

Measuring IEV is similar to the procedure of OEV. The
search region expands from including only the anchor node
per se to a predefined search boundary in order to derive
the maximum vulnerability ratio. The only difference is that
instead of accounting for exits, the method now considers
entrances, referring to the lanes leading into the region. For
the sake of simplicity, the search for the IEV is not illustrated
in a step-by-step process. Figure 2(a) shows the scenario
where traffic headed towards node A may encounter the
highest level of movement difficulty. This is the search region
within which anchor node A’s IEV is derived. Figure 2(b)
shows that A’s inbound vulnerability ratio varies by the
size of the search region and reaches the maximum at five
nodes.
3.2. Formulation. It can be seen from the illustration that the
model enumerates all combinations of nodes in a search for
the ratio that represents the bottleneck travel scenario. The
model is also subject to three graph constraints that (1) the
search region contains the anchor node, (2) the search region

has an upper boundary, and (3) the network is continuous
[27].
One remaining issue is the representation of road capacity. This factor can be estimated by consolidating the number
of lanes and road speed limits, because a higher speed limit
allows for faster movement. Based on this premise, two
evacuation vulnerability indices are derived by defining road
capacity as the number of lanes weighted by the speed limits
(𝑉out and 𝑉in ), as illustrated by (4). Although these two equations may not fully explain the intrinsic nature of evacuation
efficiency, they do imply that these two components are
essential mediators of road capacity.
OEV = max (

𝑇out
)
𝑉out 𝐶out

𝑇
IEV = max ( in ) .
𝑉in 𝐶in

(4)

It is necessary to clearly state this problem in a mathematical form to better understand the nuances. Equations (5)
through (13) have been developed to formulate the respective
measures of OEV and IEV based on the original CCM [27,
28].
Given a continuous graph 𝑉, the objective is to find a
section 𝑉푟 of 𝑉 that includes node 𝑟 and is limited in size
(with a maximum of 𝑠 nodes). This section 𝑉푟 maximizes the
vulnerability ratio defined by the objective function (5). Node
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Figure 2: The procedure of searching for the IEV of anchor node A: (a) when the region includes five nodes, the ratio reaches its maximum
and node A’s IEV is derived; (b) the relationship between node A’s inbound vulnerability ratio and the number of nodes in the search region.

r’s outbound evacuation vulnerability (OEV푟 ) is defined as
follows:
Objective is
OEV푟 = max

∑푖 𝑎푖 𝑥푖
∑푖 ∑푗 𝐶푖푗 𝑦푖푗 𝑉푖푗 𝑧푖푗

subject to


𝑥푖 − 𝑥푗  ≤ 𝑦푖푗



(6)

∑ 𝑥푖 ≤ 𝑠

(7)

푖

𝑥푖 , 𝑦푖푗 , 𝑧푖푗 ∈ {0, 1}

(5)

∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑉,

(8)

where
{1 if node 𝑖 is in 𝑉푟
𝑥푖 = {
0 otherwise
{

(9)

denominator of (5) specifies that an eligible exit of the search
region is subject to two binary variables 𝑦푖푗 and 𝑧푖푗 : 𝑦푖푗 controls
if road 𝑖𝑗 traverses the boundary of the 𝑉푟 section, as defined
by (10) and 𝑧푖푗 controls the travel direction of road 𝑖𝑗, as
defined by (11). If the two end-nodes of road 𝑖𝑗 are positioned
on either side of the boundary of the search region, and the
road is headed outward, 𝑦푖푗 and 𝑧푖푗 will both be one, road 𝑖𝑗
will then be considered an eligible exit, and the number of
lanes 𝑐푖푗 and speed limit v푖푗 will be included in the total exit
capacity. Equation (6) states that if two end-nodes are in two
subsets, 𝑦푖푗 has to be one. Equation (7) ensures that the size
of the search region cannot exceed a maximum of 𝑠 nodes.
Equation (8) specifies that 𝑥푖 , 𝑦푖푗 , and 𝑧푖푗 are binary variables.
Similarly, the inbound evacuation vulnerability (IEV푟 ) for
node 𝑟 can be formulated with minor revisions from the
previous formulation, as shown in (12) and (13).
Objective is
IEV푟 = max

𝑦푖푗
{1
={
0
{

if node 𝑖 is in 𝑉푟 and node 𝑗 is not in 𝑉푟 (10)

(12)

subject to (6) (7) (8),
where notations follow the former formulation, except

otherwise

{1 if travel from node 𝑖 to 𝑗 is permitted
𝑧푖푗 = {
0 otherwise,
{

∑푖 𝑏푖 𝑥푖
∑푖 ∑푗 𝐶푖푗 𝑦푖푗 𝑉푖푗 𝑧푖푗

(11)

𝑎푖 : outbound traffic originated at node 𝑖,
𝐶푖푗 : number of lanes of road 𝑖𝑗 in one direction,
𝑠: maximum nodes in the search region,
𝑟: index of the anchor node,
𝑉푖푗 : speed limit of road 𝑖𝑗.
Equation (5) is the objective function maximizing the
ratio of outbound traffic to the exits of a region. This
maximum ratio is the OEV of the anchor node 𝑟. The
numerator of (5) includes a binary variable 𝑥푖 to consolidate
all outbound traffic in a search region, as defined by (9). The

{1
𝑧푖푗 = {
0
{

if travel from node 𝑗 to 𝑖 is permitted
otherwise,

(13)

𝑏푖 : inbound traffic headed towards node i.
The changes made to the equation above are reflected
in the objective function (12) and the definition of an
eligible entrance, whose direction is constrained by the binary
variable 𝑧푖푗 in (13). Equation (12) specifies that the IEV of
the anchor node is derived from a region where the ratio
of inbound traffic (i.e., the numerator) to the weighted road
capacity of all entrances (i.e., the denominator) is maximized.
These two effects of vulnerability are derived at nodes. The
risk pattern can be better understood through visualization
on road segments. Although there are many ways to generate
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Figure 3: The layout of the transport network in Dublin with (a) the cumulative outbound traffic volume and (b) the cumulative inbound
traffic volume.

the segment value by referring to the attributes of its two endnodes (e.g., min, max, and mean), in this study, the average
of the two end-nodes is adopted to represent the vulnerability
of a road segment. Classifying vulnerability in a GIS will help
to identify neighborhoods that are likely to suffer from traffic
congestion for two differentiated groups: evacuees and first
responders. In the next section, the method is applied to a
real-world travel scenario, where further discussion of this
model is provided.

4. Case Study: Road Network Vulnerability in
Suburban Columbus, OH
4.1. Background. Dublin is a suburban community located
in Northwest Columbus, OH, USA. According to the 2015
census, the community covers an area of 64.2 km2 and has
a residential population of 45,098. There are two major
highways, I-270 and US-33, in the region. The data includes
all transport characteristics of the road network and morning
peak hour Origin-Destination (OD) flow patterns [37]. By
consolidating OD flow at the nodal location, the cumulative
outbound and inbound traffic from and to each node can be
derived. These two nodal indices were used to approximate
the real-time traffic demand in an evacuation. Because
Dublin is an open system with traffic flowing in and out to
other areas, nodes on the fringe of the area can be regarded as
gateways through which external traffic passes. In the model,
the external traffic is treated as local traffic departing from
and arriving at the gateway nodes. A bird’s eye view of the
region with two different traffic patterns is shown in Figure 3,

which represents the traffic that evacuees and first responders
may possibly encounter in a no-notice evacuation. It must be
noted that because the datasets were collected from an earlier
network study, they no longer reflect current traffic status.
4.2. Results. The EVM model was implemented on the platform of ESRI ArcGIS Desktop 10.3. Although ArcGIS is a
powerful tool for manipulating spatial databases and visualizing geographic features, it falls short in its capability
to develop a generic algorithm for optimization purposes.
For this reason, all the datasets were initially geocoded in
ArcGIS and exported to a text file for external processing.
Microsoft Visual C++ was adopted as the external platform
for customizing the optimization algorithm. OEV and IEV
for both nodes and road segments in the network were
derived using C++ and were imported back to ArcGIS for
visualization.
Figure 4 shows the evacuation vulnerability with a maximum search region of 20 nodes. Both the OEV (Figure 4(a))
and IEV levels (Figure 4(b)) are reflected in the road segments
of the network. The two graphics illustrate the ratios under
the same classification scheme with five categories ranging
from low-risk (dark blue) to high-risk (red). Road network
vulnerability between evacuees and first responders can be
identified by comparing the results. First, the results with
regard to the vulnerability levels of the two populations are
very similar, indicating that evacuees and first responders face
a similar level of evacuation risk regardless of their purposes
of movement. This result can be explained by analyzing
the original traffic data, which shows similar outbound and
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Figure 4: The evacuation vulnerability in the study area for (a) evacuees and (b) first responders (search boundary = 20 nodes).

inbound traffic patterns. Secondly, both figures depict high
levels of evacuation difficulty on two highways, I-270 and US33, which surprisingly echoes the normal traffic pattern in
this region. Although highways have larger road capacities
due to an increased number of lanes and higher speed limits
than local streets, they are more vulnerable in no-notice
evacuations because of fewer outlets for dispersing traffic
[38]. This observation further verifies that the road topology
plays an integral role in dictating evacuation vulnerability.
Third, the vulnerability at the two ends of I-270 appears
to be overstated. This can be attributed to the added traffic
from external regions. Future studies should focus on better
incorporating this external traffic to improve the rigor of the
assessment.
4.3. Discussion. Although this study has revealed some interesting findings of the evacuation difficulty faced by both
evacuees and first responders, questions arise about the
validity of the model. Validating a vulnerability model is
always challenging because the course of evacuation cannot
be replicated in reality and the actual travel patterns vary
by time of day. However, a similar goal can be achieved
by analyzing the sensitivity of the model. It would be of
significance to explore how the results could be affected by
different model variables and how the model validity can
be ensured by adding variations to the scenario. The section
further elaborates the vulnerability levels faced by evacuees
and first responders in two different cases.
Sensitivity Analysis of Search Boundary. The search boundary
is the size of the search region, beyond which the search for
the evacuation vulnerability is terminated. As a limitation of

the CCM, the search boundary is a variable yet to be explored
[27]. Because the search boundary of the case is originally
given as 20 nodes, it would be interesting to test if the OEV
and IEV patterns are sensitive to the variable change so as to
establish a robust criterion for future applications.
The model was run with the search boundaries of 10,
15, 20, and 25 nodes, respectively. The result for the OEV
is shown in Figure 5 and Table 1. The result for IEV is
shown in Table 2. As the search boundary expands, the mean
OEV and IEV significantly increase while the increase of the
standard deviation (SD) is minor (Figure 5(d)). The same
pattern is observed on both nodes and lines (Tables 1 and 2).
This result is informative as the maximum search boundary
characterizes the impact of the no-notice event in areas that
need to be immediately evacuated. The result indicates that
the overall vulnerability of evacuees and responders in facing
such a no-notice event will escalate as the magnitude of the
hazard increases. However, by comparing Figures 5(a)–5(c),
it becomes apparent that the overall spatial patterns are very
similar, indicating that the increase in hazard impact will not
alter the risk distribution. The observation suggests that a
careful examination of the model variable is crucial because a
small value may restrict the impact of the hazard and a large
value may overstate the effect. Therefore, a precise definition
of the variable is needed prior to the model implementation
and is dependent on the nature and impact of the no-notice
event, such as the release level of a chemical spill [39].
Scenario-Based Assessment. As no-notice evacuations are unpredictable, scenario-based assessment has been readily used to answer “what if” questions regarding changes made to the initial
scenario and test the validity of the models [13, 26, 40, 41].
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Table 1: Statistics of OEV in relation to the maximum search boundary in the study area.
OEV†

Maximum search boundary (nodes)
Min
Max
Node
Mean
SD
Min
Max
Line
Mean
SD
†

10
0.0
1502930.0
29235.5
116835.3
673.9
1502930.0
25919.6
102158.6

15
1663.6
1502930.0
39597.0
121772.0
1690.5
1502930.0
35813.9
107035.4

20
2800.0
1502930.0
50956.7
124148.9
2905.4
1502930.0
46683.0
110020.1

25
3268.2
1502930.0
59378.0
124776.2
3477.5
1502930.0
54829.2
111084.1

Measurement unit is vehicles/(lanes ∗ MPH).

N

N

2
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4
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(b)
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8.0E + 04
6.0E + 04
4.0E + 04
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0
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Figure 5: The OEV under different search boundaries: (a) 10 nodes; (b) 15 nodes; (c) 25 nodes; (d) the mean value and SD of all lines by
search boundary.
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Table 2: Statistics of IEV in the scenario-based assessment.
Inbound evacuation vulnerability (IEV)†
10
15
20
A
A
A
0.0
903.7
2446.6
1105780.0
1105780.0
1105780.0
28434.3
36492.5
44574.3
95633.3
99190.1
101262.5
325.9
903.7
2568.8
1105780.0
1105780.0
1105780.0
25357.6
33024.2
40849.8
83144.0
86751.5
89340.9
2s
35 s
7m

Search boundary (nodes)
Scenario
Min
Max
Node
Mean
SD
Min
Max
Line
Mean
SD
Running time‡
†

‡

25
A
3120.7
1105780.0
50717.3
102112.0
3253.4
1105780.0
46902.4
90579.5
4 h 16 m

20
B
2446.6
1105780.0
51511.6
101500.8
2568.8
1105780.0
47589.6
89696.6
7m

Measurement unit is vehicles/(lanes ∗ MPH).
Time estimated using Windows 7 with Intel Core i7-2600 CPU @ 3.4 GHz and 8 GB RAM.

Inbound traffic

Inbound traffic
N
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A

B
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2

4

2

4
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(b)

IEV
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A

B

(km)

(km)
2

2

4
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Low

Medium

Medium
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High
(c)

4

(d)

Figure 6: The IEV faced by first responders in two scenarios: (a) original Scenario A; (b) Scenario B with an increased inbound traffic at the
mall; (c) IEV of Scenario A; (d) IEV of Scenario B.

This section explores scenario-based assessment by analyzing
the evacuation risk of first responders. The example in
Figure 6 shows the inbound traffic patterns faced by first
responders as they attempted to coordinate an unexpected
no-notice evacuation in Scenario A (Figure 6(a)) and Scenario B (Figure 6(b)). The only difference between the two
scenarios was an increase of 3,000 inbound vehicles at the

major shopping mall in Dublin in Scenario B, as highlighted
by a pink circle in Figure 6(b). The increase in traffic would
lead to increased evacuation risk for first responders and can
be quantified by the EVM model.
Figures 6(c) and 6(d) were derived, respectively, based
on the IEV measure. Compared to the result of Scenario
A, the IEV faced by first responders in Scenario B was
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intensified as seen from a slight increase at and near the mall;
and the overall statistics are shown in Table 2. This result
reveals that the increase in inbound traffic in Scenario B will
profoundly affect not only the difficulty of movement in the
highly populated region but also the efficiency of rescue teams
traveling down nearby neighborhoods. This finding further
corroborates that the difficulty of dispatching a rescue team
in a no-notice evacuation is subject to the connectivity of the
transport system and that the difficulty level increases as the
responders approach the region with dense traffic. A further
comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that IEV is slightly lower
than the OEV (as shown in the bold text), indicating that
the response team may experience a slightly lower level of
difficulty in movement than the affected population leaving
the site.
These differentiated vulnerabilities imply that coordinating a no-notice evacuation is beyond the rescue effort
expended on alleviating the onsite impact. A pressing need
is to provide a strategic plan in which the first responders
can be navigated through a congested area with a high degree
of uncertainty [42]. By identifying the spatial distribution
of vulnerabilities faced by evacuees and first responders,
proactive preparedness strategies, such as the rearrangement
of emergency vehicles and warning systems, can be employed
in the at-risk areas. In this respect, the EVM can help the
emergency managers to map the vulnerability when a high
degree of uncertainty is involved and address the problem
in an all-hazard approach [43]. This model can also provide
insights into scenario-based planning strategies and can
help to answer questions about no-notice contingencies in a
targeted region, such as “how would a road closure affect local
evacuation?” and “how would the contraflow lane reversal
affect travel for evacuees and first responders?”

5. Conclusions
Vulnerability is a core concept in emergency management
and raises awareness of the geographic dimension that
emergency planners and traffic coordinators must consider.
As previous vulnerability research emphasized the socioeconomic factors in a disaster-prone area, road network
connectivity and contingencies in no-notice evacuations were
overlooked. By incorporating the facet of network topology
and differentiating risks faced by evacuees and first responders, this paper develops an innovative network model to
evaluate road network vulnerability in no-notice scenarios
and can complement the overarching understanding of risk
assessment.
Since many proactive planning strategies cannot be effectively implemented ahead of time in a no-notice evacuation,
measuring evacuation vulnerability is heavily dependent on
the configuration of transport networks (e.g., road capacity, direction of travel, and real-time traffic flow). In the
proposed EVM model, this measurement differentiates the
movement patterns of evacuees and first responders in order
to accommodate their different evacuation needs when nonotice hazards arise.
This paper not only establishes a theoretical framework
to measure evacuation vulnerability but also implements
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the model in a real-world transport network and tests the
model validity. It shows that highways are more vulnerable
in evacuations due to a limited number of outlets to disperse
traffic. This finding indicates the importance of network
topology in dictating difficulty of no-notice evacuations. The
scenario-based assessment further stresses the robustness of
the model that can account for the change of scenarios in
facing an unpredictable event. These two facets of vulnerabilities demonstrate a promising example to address the complex
issue of all-hazard emergency planning when a high level of
uncertainty is involved [43].
Several caveats must be noted prior to any realistic interpretation of the model. First, as noted in many geographic
studies, vulnerability is dependent on not only infrastructure
but also people [44]. In other words, vulnerability varies
across individuals in that each evacuee faces different challenges throughout the evacuation. Accounting for perceptions and course of action from the individual perspective is
needed for comprehensive risk assessment. Thus, the validity
of the model can be improved by accounting for individual
behavioral variables, such as mode decisions [13, 40], routing
strategies [30, 42, 45], and trip-chaining behaviors [46, 47].
Second, the road network vulnerability evaluated in the EVM
is a synthetic analysis and lacks the capability to capture
temporality. A particular evacuation scenario incorporates
a multitude of dynamic environmental variables as events
unfold [48]. The generalization of vulnerability cannot be
used for a specific hazard and only serves as a reference for
comprehensive mitigation plans. Thus, the vulnerability in
the model predicts potential travel difficulties instead of realtime travel congestion. Furthermore, potential disruptions
to transport infrastructure can inevitably arise during the
course of evacuation. Evaluating vulnerability should take
into account contingencies arising from a specific event,
including loss of network nodes and arcs [5, 42]. To this
end, a combined approach is needed to account for the
uncertainty in the scenario-based assessment, for example,
using a separate simulation method to validate if identified
critical infrastructure is susceptible to a destructive scenario
[17, 30]. This combined approach will provide a solid context
for vulnerability analysis and will accommodate situations
where a changing nature exists.
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